← Futures index · 中文 · Main forecast
Each section: Claim · Why · Evidence · Analogue · Would update if · Conf (H/M/L).
Parent: crosscut x5 political administration ai
Extends: crosscut us governance capacity · node1 §culture-war · node6 · node2
Date: 2026-07-05
Format: Claim | Why | Evidence | Analogue | Would update if | Conf
TL;DR — top 5 P’s
| P | Point est. | Role |
|---|---|---|
| P(2028 admin materially shifts AI posture) | 0.50 | CX-ADMIN-FLIP — symmetric flip risk |
| P(BMIA delayed ≥24 mo | admin flip) | 0.55 | EV-ADMIN-28 timing sensitivity |
| P(GAAIA passes w/ dev preemption intact) | 0.12 | Scenario D tail; admin continuity ↑ modestly |
| P(AISI/CAISI adequately funded ≥$50M/yr by FY2028) | 0.35 | Institutional capacity for evals |
| P(no effective federal pause through 2028) | 0.88 | CX-NO-PAUSE — all X5 scenarios preserve |
P = 0.50 — 2028-cycle administration materially shifts federal AI posture (CX-ADMIN-FLIP)
Claim: ~50% that the Jan 2029 administration implements ≥2 of 4 posture reversals (rescind 14365/14409 stack, restore AISI safety mandate, sign stronger audit statute, halt DOJ state-law challenges).
Why: Trump continuity is modal through 2028 but not certain; Dem coalition includes Encode/labor/natsec split; even R successor may shift (Hawley vetting vs Cruz preemption). Symmetric 0.50 = policy vector uncertainty, not raw party odds.
Evidence:
- 05 crux registry — CX-ADMIN-FLIP Tier 3 queue
- 08 parallel spines — S_soc admin row ◐
- EO 14110 revoked 15 mo after signing — precedent for rapid reversal
research_ai_pause_advocacy_playbook.md§1.2 — executive fragility
Analogue: EPA WOTUS rules oscillate admin-to-admin; AI EOs follow same cycle faster.
Would update if: 2028 R nominee explicitly commits to 14365/14409 continuity + BMIA → revise to ≤0.35.
Conf: M
P = 0.38 — Scenario A: continuity acceleration (2026–2029 modal admin path)
Claim: ~38% weight: Trump-class posture persists through 2029 — EO stack operational, GAAIA dies or EO-substitute, states primary for frontier duties.
Why: Incumbent advantage; $43M+ AI super PAC alignment; industry preference for voluntary EO 14409; Jun 2026 same-month cluster suggests statute optional for moderate Rs.
Evidence:
- crosscut x5 political administration ai §Scenario tree
- node6 — P(EO-only)=0.25; P(gridlock)=0.45 — A overlaps EO-only + partial gridlock
- Perkins Coie / Conversation Jun 2026 — EO 14409 explicitly non-mandatory
Analogue: Dodd-Frank post-2010 — industry adapts to executive/regulatory frame when statute stalls.
Would update if: GAAIA signed with preemption before Dec 2026 → collapse A to ≤0.20.
Conf: M
P = 0.32 — Scenario B: divided government gridlock
Claim: ~32% that 2026–28 features split Congress or non-functional unified majority → S2 paralysis plus zero major AI signature by end-2028.
Why: Overlaps S2 P=0.55 governance paralysis but requires electoral split; 60-vote Senate threshold; Freedom Caucus + anti-preemption coalition repeatable; midterm stasis per NPR Jun 2026.
Evidence:
- crosscut us governance capacity — S2 elevated paralysis 0.28
- https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2026-06-22/ai-and-tech-are-trying-to-influence-the-midterm-elections
- Cruz moratorium stripped 99–1 Jul 2025 — cross-party block on blanket federal moves
Analogue: 2011–2014 divided Congress — agency action substitutes for law.
Would update if: Bipartisan Commerce markup on BMIA and GAAIA before Nov 2026 → revise to ≤0.18.
Conf: M
P = 0.18 — Scenario C: reversal toward transparency + screening
Claim: ~18% that 2027–29 admin/Congress shift ↑ mandatory transparency (SB 53-class federal) + BMIA screening without dev preemption.
Why: Encode coalition + Dem Senate flip + EU AI Act pressure + screendna/Amodei lane; not full training pause. Requires electoral change or R fracture (Blackburn carve-out path).
Evidence:
- GAAIA draft draws from SB 53/RAISE text (Trahan release, TechPolicy.Press Jun 2026)
- node1 — P(SB53 compliance)=0.85
- Nonce Media — EU floor forces US lab compliance infrastructure Aug 2026
Analogue: Post-2008 financial reform — crisis + coalition shift after delay.
Would update if: Dem wins 2028 and first 100 days include BMIA signing → revise up to ≥0.30 for scenario weight.
Conf: M
P = 0.12 — Scenario D: reversal toward preemption-only (weak federal floor)
Claim: ~12% GAAIA or successor passes with 3-yr dev preemption + weak audit enforcement — industry capture tail.
Why: Same as Node 6 O1 P=0.12 but conditional on admin continuity + industry lobbying ($8.5M Q1 2026 preemption); House Ds opposed Jun 2026 draft but R unified govt could force floor.
Evidence:
- node6 — P(GAAIA preemption intact)=0.12
- McDonald Hopkins / ArentFox — GAAIA preemption is “most controversial”
- Playbook §2.1 — preemption = highest negative lever
Analogue: Telecom Act 1996 preemption of local entry barriers.
Would update if: Preemption stripped in committee with R chair → revise to ≤0.05.
Conf: M
P = 0.55 — BMIA delayed ≥24 mo conditional on EV-ADMIN-28 admin flip
Claim: If Jan 2029 admin flip occurs, ~55% BMIA slips ≥24 mo vs baseline (2027-12 target missed → 2029-H2+).
Why: New appointees 6–12 mo; Commerce committee restart; 119th session momentum lost; physical-layer bills eventually pass but admin transitions add full Congress cycle. Not conditional on flip direction — either party reset causes delay.
Evidence:
- BMIA referred Jan 29 2026, no floor vote Jul 2026 — already 6 mo into delay
- crosscut us governance capacity — BMIA ×0.70 under S2 → 0.32 by 2027-12
- COVID vaccine EUA — admin transitions delayed non-emergency statute ~12–18 mo
Analogue: ACA implementation delay 2017 repeal fight — regime uncertainty stalls narrow bills.
Would update if: BMIA signed Dec 2026 → conditional irrelevant; revise base BMIA P up.
Conf: M
P = 0.45 / 0.60 — BMIA by 2027-12 / 2028-06 (X5-adjusted baseline)
Claim: Baseline BMIA passage unchanged from Node 2 at S0; apply X5 scenario multipliers from parent modifier table.
Why: BMIA is admin-insensitive relative to GAAIA — Cotton–Klobuchar bipartisan; screendna Jun 2026; physical chokepoint not ideology-coded as pause.
Evidence:
- node2 §P=0.45/0.60
- https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/3741
- ARI / AI Action Plan — screening supported even under deregulatory admin
Analogue: See Node 2 BMIA sections.
Would update if: BMIA dies committee without substitute → ≤0.25 / ≤0.40.
Conf: M
P = 0.12 — GAAIA passes with 3-year state dev preemption intact (admin continuity ↑)
Claim: ~12% — same Node 6 O1; under Scenario A/D conditional P(preemption intact | GAAIA floor) ≈ 0.55.
Why: Admin continuity raises industry confidence to force floor vote; still blocked by Encode + states + 99–1 anti-preemption precedent on different frame.
Evidence:
- node6 — O1 0.12; P(preemption stripped | floor)=0.55
- Roll Call Jun 2026 — bipartisan draft, preemption fight
- Wiener/Encode opposition (playbook §313)
Analogue: See Node 6 O1.
Would update if: White House endorses preemption text in signing statement draft.
Conf: M
P = 0.18 — GAAIA passes, preemption stripped (Scenario C path)
Claim: ~18% federal audit law without gutting SB 53/RAISE dev obligations — compromise path.
Why: Obernolte explicitly solicited civil-society feedback; SB 1047→SB 53 negotiation template; Dem commission opposition to preemption not to audits.
Evidence:
- node6 — O2 0.18
- TechPolicy.Press — Trahan/Obernolte “not one framework to rule them all”
- Anthropic endorsed SB 53, criticized caps
Analogue: See Node 6 O2.
Would update if: R hold + industry kills bill entirely → revise to ≤0.10.
Conf: M
P = 0.35 — AISI/CAISI adequately funded (≥$50M/yr + ≥100 FTE by FY2028)
Claim: ~35% NIST AI center reaches adequate capacity for frontier evals (not just DeepSeek one-offs).
Why: H.R. 9363 proposes $20M/yr; GAAIA $100M/yr — both not enacted; NIST chronic underfunding; shutdown/RIF precedent; Kratsios innovation framing ≠ safety-scale budget.
Evidence:
- https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/9363 — $20M FY2027–32
- GAAIA §102 — $100M/yr authorized
- Wikipedia AISI — $10M initial Biden budget vs industry scale
- Federal News Network Jan 2026 — Obernolte codify CAISI push
Analogue: CISA pre-2015 — statutory mandate years before adequate appropriations.
Would update if: H.R. 9363 signed with ≥$50M → revise to ≥0.55.
Conf: M
P = 0.65 — CAISI remains innovation-framed (not full AISI restoration) through 2028
Claim: ~65% Trump CAISI mission persists through 2028 even if Dem wins — full AISI safety restoration delayed to statute.
Why: Rebrand survived 12 mo; Lutnick/Kratsios public framing; RIF/agency culture; Dem platform may accept “security and innovation” hybrid (Banks letter lane).
Evidence:
- Jun 2025 CAISI rebrand (Commerce)
- node6 Phase 2b — AISI→CAISI modal dual-track
- Banks Jun 2026 — CAISI visibility, not NSA solo
Analogue: DHS post-9/11 — mission creep to security without name revert.
Would update if: Dem 2029 Day 1 AISI re-rebrand → revise to ≤0.40.
Conf: M
P = 0.88 — No effective federal training pause through 2028 (CX-NO-PAUSE, X5-stable)
Claim: All four X5 scenarios preserve ~88% P(no pause) — admin flip moves vetting/screening, not training moratorium.
Why: Culture-war equilibrium (Node 1 P=0.62 vetting modal); Cruz 99–1; natsec anti-pause; Anthropic conditional expect not commit; Scenario C ↑ transparency not halt.
Evidence:
- 05 crux registry — CX-NO-PAUSE 0.88
- node1 — P(federal training cap)<0.05
- Playbook §1.5 — conditional pause mainstream, not full stop
Analogue: See CX-NO-PAUSE node refs.
Would update if: Binding training moratorium signed → falsify crux.
Conf: H
P = 0.55 — US governance paralysis S2 through 2028 (CX-US-PARALYSIS, X5-B overlap)
Claim: Scenario B embeds S2; other scenarios reduce paralysis probability — net ~55% unchanged from S2 crux when weighted.
Why: X5 does not replace S2 — adds electoral mechanism. Continuity (A) may pass BMIA despite shutdown history.
Evidence:
- crosscut us governance capacity — main crux 0.55
- Brookings shutdown tracker 2025–26
Analogue: See S2.
Would update if: GAAIA or BMIA signed before Dec 2026 → S2 and CX-US-PARALYSIS revise ≤0.35.
Conf: M
P = 0.40 — CX-BMIA holds (BMIA / mandatory screening by 2027-12)
Claim: X5-adjusted ~40% — slight ↓ from Node 2 0.45 accounting for admin-flip delay mass (0.50 × 0.55 delay).
Why: Weighted average across scenarios; EU/IGSC offset partially.
Evidence:
- node2 §P=0.45
- X5 parent modifier table
Analogue: See CX-BMIA / Node 2.
Would update if: BMIA signed → ≥0.85 conditional on enforcement.
Conf: M
P = 0.70 — 2026 midterms change ≥1 load-bearing committee chair (AI jurisdiction)
Claim: ~70% House E&C or Senate Commerce chair changes party or person Nov 2026 — normal midterm turnover + competitive map.
Why: Historical midterm seat swing; AI jurisdiction concentrated in few chairs (Obernolte, Cruz-class); even held chamber often rotates subcommittee gavels.
Evidence:
- NPR Jun 2026 — election shapes 120th Congress AI agenda
- Legis1 Jun 2026 — 10 AI bills advanced under current chairs
Analogue: 2018 Energy & Commerce leadership change stalled tech bills 6 mo.
Would update if: R expand majority with same chairs retained → revise to ≤0.45.
Conf: L–M
P = 0.25 — R unified government functional for AI statute 2027–28
Claim: ~25% R holds White House + both chambers and passes any GAAIA/BMIA-class bill before end-2028.
Why: Internal R split (preemption vs carve-outs); 60-vote Senate; Freedom Caucus CR tactics; BMIA more likely than GAAIA alone (~0.45).
Evidence:
- Gibson Dunn Mar 2026 — narrow window
- crosscut us governance capacity — modal friction 55%
Analogue: 2017 R trifecta — only TCJA cleared filibuster bar for major item.
Would update if: BMIA floor vote scheduled Q4 2026.
Conf: M
P = 0.30 — D Senate flip in 2026 midterms
Claim: ~30% Democrats gain Senate majority Nov 2026 (speculative — Jul 2026 forecast band).
Why: Standard competitive midterm map with incumbent R exposure; AI not sole driver but jobs/affordability narrative helps Ds; super PAC counterweights.
Evidence:
- GZERO / Time 2026 midterm AI salience
- OpenSecrets AI PAC spend both sides
Analogue: 2006 midterm Senate flip — war economy issue replaced by local economics; AI may play similar 2026.
Would update if: R gain seats Nov 2026 → revise to ≤0.10.
Conf: L (election forecast)
P = 0.85 — SB 53 / RAISE enforce on schedule regardless of X5 scenario
Claim: State frontier laws effective Jan 2027 with ≥85% enforcement continuity — federal admin flip does not repeal state law.
Why: SB 53 signed; RAISE amended Mar 2026 to track SB 53; federal litigation may delay but not void; Scenario D preemption is only material downgrade.
Evidence:
- node1 — P(SB53)=0.85
- Carnegie Feb 2026 — state enforcement capacity critique (separate from existence)
- Law.com Jan 2026 — EO 14365 vs Jan 1 effective dates unsettled
Analogue: CA privacy (CCPA) enforced despite federal absence.
Would update if: Supreme Court blocks SB 53 dev duties → revise to ≤0.50.
Conf: M–H
P = 0.45 — DOJ AI Litigation Task Force files challenge to blue-state law by end-2027
Claim: ~45% federal lawsuit vs CA/NY/IL frontier law before 2028 election — political timing favors 2027 filing.
Why: EO 14365 mandates Task Force; Jan 2026 DOJ memo; no filing Jul 2026 — delay may be strategy; Commerce onerous list still pending.
Evidence:
- https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1422986/dl — Task Force memo
- Mondaq Jan 2026 — Article II preemption via litigation
- Mintz Mar 2026 — Framework doubles down on preemption
Analogue: DOJ vs CA net neutrality — multiyear litigation without immediate strike-down.
Would update if: Task Force disbanded Jan 2029 → path dead.
Conf: L–M
P = 0.60 — EO 14409 voluntary framework operational by Q1 2027
Claim: ~60% NSA-led “covered frontier model” designation + voluntary 30-day review functioning for ≥2 frontier labs.
Why: 60-day deadline from Jun 2026 → Aug 2026 design; industry incentive to participate (gov cyber clearinghouse); not legally mandatory — OpenAI/xAI may opt in partially.
Evidence:
- EO 14409 §3 — 60-day framework design
- Perkins Coie Jun 2026 — voluntary emphasis
- node6 — EO-only 0.25 as substitute for GAAIA
Analogue: Vulnerability Equities Process — voluntary gov access norm.
Would update if: Zero lab participation announced by Mar 2027 → revise to ≤0.25.
Conf: M
P = 0.72 — EU AI Act sets de facto compliance floor for US frontier labs (Aug 2026+)
Claim: ~72% Anthropic/OpenAI/Google-class labs maintain EU-grade GPAI documentation for global products regardless of X5 US admin scenario.
Why: Aug 2 2026 applicability; extraterritorial scope; product economics favor single compliance stack; Nonce Media “compliance asymmetry” argument.
Evidence:
- https://www.noncemedia.com/us-ai-federal-preemption-great-american-ai-act-2026/
- Kennedy’s Law 2025 — EU extraterritorial application
node9— P(EU binds US)=0.14 for binding US law; higher for de facto practices
Analogue: GDPR — US companies complied for global ops without US statute.
Would update if: Major US lab exits EU market → revise to ≤0.40.
Conf: M–H
P = 0.28 — EU accelerates US federal legislation via competitive pressure (Brussels Effect on Congress)
Claim: ~28% EU enforcement before US statute increases Congress urgency to pass GAAIA/BMIA-class bill 2027–28.
Why: Brussels Effect on companies is high (0.72 above); on Congress is weaker — US federal vacuum persists by design under Trump; EU Digital Omnibus may slow EU own deadlines.
Evidence:
- Trilligent 2025 — “end of Brussels Effect?” under US deregulation
- Internet Policy Review — experimentalist governance vs Brussels Effect for AI Act
- Nonce Media — “watched closely in Washington”
Analogue: GDPR did not produce US federal privacy law by 2026.
Would update if: GAAIA markup explicitly cites EU Aug 2026 deadline → revise to ≥0.40.
Conf: L–M
P = 0.62 — Culture-war vetting coalition modal wins (N1 ext, admin-stable)
Claim: ~62% BMIA + SB 53 + GUARD-class vetting advance; no federal training pause — stable across X5 except Scenario D tail.
Why: See Node 1 culture-war section; admin changes reweight not replace.
Evidence:
- node1 §P=0.62
- crosscut secondary cruxes §7
Analogue: See Node 1.
Would update if: Federal training moratorium signed.
Conf: M
P = 0.20 — Anti-regulation fusion (GAAIA O1 tail) under continuity admin
Claim: ~20% broad preemption without ELVIS/KOSA/NO FAKES carve-outs — Node 1 tail; ↑ under Scenario A/D.
Why: $8.5M preemption lobbying; Trump EO stack; industry wants uniformity.
Evidence:
- node1 §P=0.20
- Playbook §2.1
Analogue: See Node 1 anti-regulation tail.
Would update if: Blackburn carve-outs explicitly in GAAIA final text → ≤0.08.
Conf: M
P = 0.15 — Biden-era 14110-style compute reporting restored by 2029
Claim: ~15% mandatory compute/training reporting above threshold returns even under Scenario C — full 14110 restoration unlikely (Beat China frame).
Why: 14110 revoked completely; Dems may prefer SB 53 federalization over compute caps; hardware metering still immature.
Evidence:
- Longterm Wiki E366 — 85% completed then revoked
- Playbook §1.5 — verification window closing
- SB 1047 veto — caps dead in CA
Analogue: Assault weapons ban restoration attempts — symbolic, rarely full revert.
Would update if: GAAIA includes training registration title → revise to ≥0.30.
Conf: L–M
P = 0.08 — Populist moratorium floor vote (Cruz-class, admin-sensitive)
Claim: ~8% R-led moratorium floor vote — ↑ slightly under continuity if used as preemption negotiation lever.
Why: Cruz BBB stripped 99–1; still in Overton window; not admin priority.
Evidence:
- node1 §P=0.08
- Playbook §1.2 Cruz dynamic
Analogue: See Node 1.
Conf: L
P = 0.42 — House advances CAISI codification (H.R. 9363 or successor) by end-2027
Claim: ~42% statutorily establishes NIST AI center — may be underfunded ($20M).
Why: Bipartisan Science Committee interest; Obernolte/Kratsios alignment; ≠ same as adequate funding P=0.35.
Evidence:
- https://legis1.com/news/ai-bills-congress-house-advances-10-to-boost-us
- H.R. 9363 text — Center for AI Security and Innovation
- Chair Babin funding commitment signal (Legis1)
Analogue: NIST cybersecurity framework codification — years from bill to budget.
Would update if: H.R. 9363 dies in appropriations → ≤0.20.
Conf: M
P = 0.33 — S.3952 (Future of AI Innovation Act) passes Senate before 2028
Claim: ~33% Young–Cantwell–Blackburn innovation/standards bill becomes law — parallel track to GAAIA, less preemption fight.
Why: Bipartisan cosponsors Feb 2026; star print Mar 2026; may attach to NDAA or lame duck.
Evidence:
- https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/3952
- Federal News Network — parallel codify CAISI debate
Analogue: CHIPS Act — standards/innovation can pass when omnibus safety stalls.
Would update if: Bill dies committee Dec 2027 → ≤0.15.
Conf: M
P = 0.03 — Civil war-scale conflict by 2030 (link S2 — not X5 primary)
Claim: ~3% — same as S2; admin change crux does not materially move this tail.
Why: See crosscut us governance capacity §P=0.03 — link only.
Evidence: S2 civil war section; Brookings shutdown analysis.
Analogue: See S2.
Would update if: See S2 falsifiers.
Conf: L
Actor table — Congress, White House, labs, EU
| Actor | Admin alignment (2026) | Key lever | P(modal action) | X5 sensitivity | Conf |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trump White House | Acceleration | EO 14365/14409; Framework | P(EO wins over GAAIA)=0.25 | High — defines Scenario A | M |
| DOJ AI Litigation Task Force | Acceleration | Sue blue states | P(filing by 2027)=0.45 | High — flip ends active cases | M |
| House E&C (Obernolte) | Bipartisan safety + R innovation | GAAIA markup | P(markup 2027)=0.50 | Chair flip → preemption ↓ | M |
| Senate Commerce (Cruz) | R uniformity | BMIA path, preemption | P(BMIA report)=0.55 | Natsec framing survives flip | M |
| Senate Judiciary (Hawley) | Populist vetting | GUARD | P(GUARD advances)=0.70 | Low admin sensitivity | M |
| Blackburn (R-TN) | Selective preemption | Carve-outs gatekeeper | P(carve-outs hold)=0.65 | Med — blocks Scenario D tail | M |
| Encode / Wiener | State transparency | Anti-preemption | P(SB53 stands)=0.85 | High — Scenario C ally | H |
| OpenAI | Industry pragmatist | Voluntary EO + GAAIA negotiate | P(opposes dev preemption)=0.55 | Med | M |
| Anthropic | Safety + EU compliance | Public First PAC; SB 53 endorse | P(EU-floor compliance)=0.90 | Low — admin-independent | H |
| xAI / Musk | Acceleration | Anti-”woke AI” narrative | P(jobs frame wins)=0.85 | High — Scenario A mascot | M |
| a16z / Big Tech | Preemption | $8.5M+ lobbying | P(federal cap)<0.05 | Med | H |
| AFL-CIO Workers First | Labor bridge | Displacement, not pause | P(sustains agenda)=0.75 | Med — Scenario C ally | M |
| EU AI Office | External floor | GPAI Aug 2026 enforcement | P(de facto US lab compliance)=0.72 | Low — orthogonal to US admin | M–H |
| Leading the Future PAC | Pro-innovation R | Midterm spend | P(continuity R)=0.55 | High | L–M |
| Public First Action PAC | Safety oversight D/R | Midterm spend | P(Senate safety caucus)=0.35 | Med | L–M |
Crux modifier summary — CX-BMIA, CX-US-PARALYSIS, CX-NO-PAUSE
| Crux | Baseline P | X5 modifier (how to apply) |
|---|---|---|
| CX-BMIA | 0.40 | Scenario A ×1.05; B ×0.70–0.75 (S2 stack); C ×1.20–1.25; admin flip delay +12–24 mo mass |
| CX-US-PARALYSIS | 0.55 | Scenario B = primary trigger; A ×0.85; C with unified D ×0.70 |
| CX-NO-PAUSE | 0.88 | Scenario A/D ×1.02–1.04; C ×0.96–0.97 (vetting ↑, pause still unlikely) — ≤3pp relative |
Do not multiply CX-US-PARALYSIS × Scenario B × S2 elevated paralysis as independent — use parent stitching rule.
p(doom) direction (X5 evidence summary)
| X5 path | Bio tail | Misalign | No pause | Whimper |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A continuity | Modal | Modal race | ↑ | Modal |
| B gridlock | ↑ +3–6pp cond. T2 | Ambiguous | ↑↑ | ↑ |
| C transparency | ↓ BMIA ↑ | ±0–1pp | ↓ modest | ↓ modest |
| D preemption | ↑ weak screening | ↑ 1–2pp | ↑↑ | ↑ |
Update log
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-07-05 | Initial 28 P sections + actor table + crux modifiers |